Evaluating pluralism : diversity of interest groups’ policy demands and preference attainment in the European Commission’s open consultations : evidence from the eu environmental policy by BUNEA, Adriana
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Author and Author Author  
MWP 2014/03 
Max Weber Programme 
 
Evaluating Pluralism: Diversity of Interest Groups’ 
Policy Demands and Preference Attainment in the 
European Commission’s Open Consultations. Evidence 
from the EU Environmental Policy. 
 
driana Bunea 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  European University Institute 
Max Weber Programme 
 
 
 
Evaluating Pluralism: Diversity of Interest Groups’ Policy Demands 
and Preference Attainment in the European Commission’s Open 
Consultations. Evidence from the EU Environmental Policy. 
 
Adriana Bunea 
 
EUI Working Paper MWP 2014/03 
 
  
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
 
ISSN 1830-7728 
 
© Adriana Bunea, 2014 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Abstract 
How is the EU interest group system structured in terms of the aggregate distribution of interests 
groups’ policy preferences and levels of preference attainment? And, when examined from this 
perspective, to what extent should we adjust the commonly held view that the EU is a pluralist system 
in terms of interest representation and intermediation? The study addresses these questions by 
proposing a systematic, empirical investigation of the pluralist accounts based on two dimensions. The 
first dimension looks at policy issue characteristics and captures the plurality of preferences 
articulated by interest groups across issues. The second dimension captures levels of achieved 
preferences across different advocate types, with the aim of identifying any potential bias in terms of 
influence over policy outcomes in favour of some type of interests. The study examines EU lobbying 
in the context of EC environmental open consultations and develops three indexes measuring plurality 
within the EU interest group system. The empirical analysis shows that, at least in the area of 
environmental policy, the EU interest intermediation system does not fit a classic pluralist approach, 
but it is best described by what the study identifies as a constrained pluralist view. The findings 
indicate on average rather moderate levels of diversity of preferences articulated on issues, low to 
moderate levels of heterogeneity of policy preferences within interest type and a pattern of 
significantly higher levels of preference attainment on behalf of organizations representing business 
interests.   
Keywords 
EU system of interest representation, European Commission, open consultations, policy 
preferences, preference attainment, environmental policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Developing a participatory and inclusive policymaking process within the European 
Union has been a constant concern for the architects of European integration in the last 20 years 
(Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007). Interest groups are widely perceived as channels through which 
societal interests express their policy preferences and as key actors in effective problem solving 
(Finke 2007). Recent contributions to the study of the EU interest group system provide valuable 
insights into which interest groups are active in each policy area (Greenwood 2007a; Geyer 
2001), about their capabilities and resources (Bouwen 2002; Mahoney 2007b, 2011), lobbying 
strategies or access to different institutional or “influence venues” (Broscheid and Coen 2007; 
Bouwen and McCown 2007; Mazey and Richardson 2006, Mahoney 2007a). However, a 
systematic, quantitative analysis of the policy space described by interest groups’ discrete policy 
preferences and, most importantly, lobbying success is currently rather an exception in the 
literature (see however Bunea 2013). Currently, the literature lacks an evaluation of the EU 
interest intermediation system based on a detailed analysis of interest groups’ formally 
articulated demands on a set of well-defined, discrete policy issues characterizing different 
policymaking events in one or more policy domains.  
The present study addresses this by asking the following two inter-related research 
questions: how is the EU interest group system structured in terms of the aggregate distribution 
of groups’ formally articulated policy preferences and their levels of preference attainment? 
And, when examined from this perspective, to what extent should we adjust the commonly held 
view that the EU is a pluralist system in terms of interest representation and intermediation?  
Evaluating the EU interest group system by focusing on the level of policy issues and by 
systematically examining interest groups’ preferences is relevant for at least two reasons. First, 
mapping preferences is essential for understanding the aggregate constellation of demands 
formally articulated at EU level by interest organizations as alternative channels of 
representation within non-elected yet powerful EU bodies such as the European Commission 
(Greenwood 2007a; Saurugger 2008). The aggregate distribution of these preferences sets the 
limits within which policymakers take decisions that are politically legitimate and practically 
feasible (Skodvin et al. 2010, Yackee 2006a, 2006b), and provides invaluable insights into the 
patterns of policy conflict (Browne 1990) and interest groups’ competition (Nownes 2000; 
Holyoke 2009). A detailed examination of these preferences thus provides a more refined tool 
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for examining the EU policymaking process in terms of democratic legitimacy and policy input 
provided by stakeholders. 
Second, estimating interest groups’ formally articulated preferences is an essential 
prerequisite for a reliable measurement of their policy influence. This aspect has been identified 
as one of the most important challenges of the literature on interest groups in general 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998) and that of EU interest groups in particular (Mahoney 2007b; 
Dür 2008b). If policy influence or lobbying success is conceptualized as “preference attainment” 
(Dür 2008b; Beyers et al. 2008; Leech et al. 2007, Mahoney 2007b), then a detailed estimation 
of interest groups’ preferences is a prerequisite for any analysis focusing on estimating their 
lobbying success and policy influence. An accurate identification of the winners and losers of the 
EU policymaking is of paramount importance for identifying patterns of potential bias of the 
decision-making process and consequently of the interest group system in favour of some 
particular interests. As Beyers et al. (2008) rightly argue, “[t]he bias question is one of the most 
enduring and important in interest groups research. It has major normative implications for the 
characterisation of European/EU democracy, political legitimacy and European politics 
generally” (Beyers et al. 2008: 1117). 
In its methodological approach, this study builds upon two well-established traditions in 
the literature on US interest groups. First, following Laumann and Knoke (1987), the research 
proposes an examination of the interest intermediation system at policy domain level, by 
examining several open consultations in the EU environmental area (see also Coen and Katsaitis 
2013). Second, in line with Browne (1990) and Salisbury et al. (1987), the research proposes an 
evaluation of the plurality of the EU interest intermediation system by using issue level data. As 
such, the study conducts an empirical investigation of groups’ policy preferences and proposes 
three new indexes for evaluating the level of pluralism characterizing the EU interest groups 
system. Two indexes measure the plurality of policy alternatives articulated by interest groups on 
individual policy issues, while the third is an index of groups’ preference attainment across a set 
of issues characterizing the analyzed policymaking (consultation) events.  
In constructing its theoretical argument, this study builds on both American and 
European literature on systems of interest intermediation, identifies two theoretical views of 
pluralism in the EU interest groups system and derives a set of observable implications that are 
tested against the empirics. It is argued that when examined from the perspective of the three 
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proposed dimensions, at least in the environmental policy area, the EU interest intermediation 
system does not fit a classic pluralist approach, but it is best described by what the study 
identifies as a constrained pluralist view. The results indicate on average rather moderate levels 
of diversity of preferences articulated on issues, low to moderate levels of heterogeneity of 
policy preferences within interest type and a pattern of significantly higher levels of preference 
attainment on behalf of organizations representing business interests.   
The present analysis makes a contribution to the literature on EU interest group research 
in two ways. In theoretical terms, the analysis addresses one important debate in the literature 
regarding the most appropriate label for the EU interest intermediation system (see Coen and 
Richardson 2009: 337-350). The study provides in this respect one of the first detailed empirical 
investigations of the EU interest group system based on interest groups’ policy preferences, 
based on which different theoretical labels proposed for describing this system can be tested.  
Second, the study proposes an original approach to the measurement of plurality of voices 
characterizing the EU interest intermediation system by computing two innovative indexes 
aimed at capturing the heterogeneity of policy demands articulated by interest groups, while 
suggesting a measure of lobbying success conceptualized as preference attainment.  
The argument of the study proceeds as follows: the first part provides an overview of 
existing approaches to the examination of EU interest group system and explains how a more 
refined dimension, based on groups’ discrete policy preferences, adds important information to 
the understanding of the system. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical 
considerations based on which the diversity and preference attainment indexes are computed to 
capture the plurality of the interest intermediation system. Part three outlines the research design. 
Part four presents the proposed plurality indexes and discusses them in the light of the existing 
pluralist accounts of the EU interest representation system. Section five concludes. 
 
1. CURRENT APPROACHES TO EVALUATING THE EU SYSTEM OF INTEREST 
REPRESENTATION 
 
The existing literature describes the EU interest group system based on two main 
research agendas. The first one focuses on the interest group population active at EU level 
(Berkhout and Lowery 2011, 2010, 2008; Wonka et al. 2010; Hix 2005; Greenwood 2007a; 
Coen and Katsaitis 2013). This approach focuses on the number of groups active in the EU 
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policymaking arena, on their advocate type and organizational form. According to this approach, 
the more numerous and diverse the interest groups participating in the EU decision-making 
events are, the closer the system is to a classic pluralist model of interest intermediation. At the 
end of the 1990s, Aspinwall and Greenwood (1998) described the EU interest intermediation 
system as being characterized by a disproportionally stronger presence and lobby mobilization of 
business groups. However, most of the current contributions focusing on this dimension describe 
the EU system as pluralist based on the fact that in general most of the existing societal, regional 
and national interests are represented by interest organizations at EU level (Eising 2008).  
The second approach focuses on the actual access of interest groups to the EU institutions 
and policy process (Mazey and Richardson 2006; Coen 1997, 1998; Bouwen 2002; Eising 2007; 
Woll 2006). The logic behind this approach is to examine which interest groups get actual access 
to the decision-making processes at EU level, based on the assumption that only those 
organizations having access to different decision-making points can effectively channel and 
voice the interests they represent, becoming thus potentially of consequence over policy 
outcomes. Most of these contributions emphasize the “elite pluralist” nature of the EU 
governance system, suggesting that, in general, in terms of access to lobbying venues and key 
decision-making points there is a bias towards EU umbrella organizations and lobby groups 
representing big business (Hix 2005; Beyers 2004; Coen 1998). Hix even speaks of a “primitive 
pluralism” characterizing the EU intermediation system, “in which there is little countervailing 
power to block manipulation of the political process by the owners of capital” (Hix 2005: 231).  
Based on these two approaches, the EU interest group system has been labelled as 
“pluralist” (Streeck and Schmitter 1991), “elite pluralist” (Eising 2007, Coen 1998) “semi-
pluralist” (see also Eising 2008: 7), while Coen and Richardson (2009) prefer the term 
“chameleon pluralism” to capture the variation in the plurality levels characterizing the EU 
interest intermediation system.  
The existing contributions provide essential insights, but examining an interest 
intermediation system based only on the two above mentioned dimensions (i.e presence in and 
access to the policymaking process or decision makers) presents a series of limitations. First, 
both dimensions provide an incomplete description of the interest group system because the 
information on the number and type of interest groups active at EU level does not provide any 
substantial insights into groups’ actual lobbying activities, policy influence attempts or policy 
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preferences across a series of policy issues, decision-making events and policy areas. Similar 
approaches to the study of US interest group and its bias representation levels, focusing on 
counts of interest groups, have been rightly criticized for not accurately capturing the more 
complex dynamics which characterize the evolution of an interest intermediation system 
(Lowery and Gray 2004: 20-21). Second, examining the existence of a possible systemic bias in 
favour of some interests should not be based exclusively on their observed or reported access to 
decision-making venues but rather on a systematic and more empirical analysis of patterns of 
interest groups’ preference attainment (Lowery and Gray 2004). Third, the existing dimensions 
do not capture the specific policymaking context in which organizations develop their lobbying 
activities and say little about the formal interactions between decision makers and interest groups 
or between interest groups themselves. The existing literature on EU interest groups keeps silent 
over issues such as the level of contentiousness over policy alternatives and the diversity of 
competing policy demands to which decision makers are exposed to. As suggested in the classic 
literature on American interest groups (Salisbury et al. 1987; Browne 1990) these are all 
essential dimensions in analyzing the structuring of an interest group system.  
However, the existing contributions have the merit of identifying two broad theoretical 
frameworks that are currently used to describe the EU interest group system: a classic pluralist 
approach describing a fully plural EU interest intermediation system, and a “constrained” 
pluralist approach, according to which the plurality of voices articulated in the system is rather 
limited. The present study builds upon these two approaches by proposing three alternative 
measures of the plurality in the system to investigate for which of the two frameworks there is 
more empirical support. The observable implications derived in relation to each framework are 
presented in the next section. 
 
2. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: EXAMINING POLICY ISSUES, PREFERENCES 
AND INTEREST GROUPS’ PREFERENCE ATTAINMENT  
 
The present study acknowledges the premises for a pluralist interest intermediation 
system at EU level and proposes a more systematic, empirical investigation of the pluralist 
accounts based on two dimensions. The first dimension looks at issue level characteristics and 
captures the plurality of preferences formally articulated by interest groups for different policy 
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outcomes, across five environmental consultations. The second dimension captures levels of 
achieved preferences across different advocate types, with the aim of identifying any potential 
bias in terms of influence over policy outcomes in favour of some type of interests. More 
specifically, the study examines EU lobbying in the context of EC open consultations and it is 
therefore interested in the degree to which interest organizations translate their demands into the 
text of the policy proposal adopted by the Commission following these consultations. 
The first dimension is built upon a well-established tradition in the American literature on 
interest groups for which the plurality of preferences articulated by private actors and their 
competition to get translated into policy outcomes has long been considered a key aspect in 
evaluating the structure of the interest group systems (Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay and 
Yackee 2007; Golden 1998; Browne 1990; Salisbury et al. 1987). I argue that by examining in 
greater detail the discrete preferences expressed by interest organizations on a series of policy 
issues, one can perform a more refined test of the pluralist accounts of the EU interest group 
system. The level of diverse, competing preferences formally articulated during the policy 
formulation stage gives a reliable and more complex indication of the level of plurality of voices 
and policy input introduced in the EU policymaking system. 
The second dimension proposed, capturing a measure of achieved preferences, allows a 
more subtle identification of any patterns which might characterize the interactions between 
interest groups and policymakers in terms of winning the policy influence game. This dimension 
allows a detailed observation of whether or not there is a bias within the policymaking process 
towards the demands expressed by particular types of interests (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). 
The EU interest group literature speaks of a bias in the decision-making system that favours 
business interests (Coen 2009, 1998; Chari and Kritzinger 2006; Hix 2005; Beyers 2004; 
Greenwood 2007b; Kohler-Koch 1997; Pollack 1997). This argument requires however further 
empirical testing as the existing contributions suffer from several methodological challenges 
when explaining lobbying success. For example, existing contributions rely largely on the use of 
interviews with interest groups’ representatives, based on which a rather broad description of 
groups’ policy preferences and lobbying success is derived (Mahoney 2007b; but see also 
Michalowitz 2007).This research strategy commonly focuses on a restricted number of interest 
groups, and is not able to capture the full universe of stakeholders involved in a policymaking 
event; it is only able to gather information on a group’s preferences and preference attainment on 
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a restricted number of (main) policy issues. This approach does not usually account for interest 
groups’ preferences on other relevant issues, thus oversimplifying the realities of lobbying within 
a policymaking event. As shown in greater detail in the next section describing the research 
design, EU policymaking events are characterized by multidimensionality. The number of issues 
identified per consultation ranges from 6 to 51 across the five analyzed events. As such, an 
accurate and reliable analysis of interest groups’ success to influence outcomes should take into 
account all demands expressed on all issues characterizing an event with the maximum possible 
precision. In addition, self-reported or peer-reported levels of policy influence or lobbying 
success can potentially suffer from informant bias, which translates into distorted evaluations of 
interest representation and interest realization within the EU policymaking system. 
The approach proposed by this study aims to ameliorate these challenges and allows a 
more refined evaluation of the relative lobbying success by proposing a measure that takes into 
account the universe of all issues, stakeholders and preferences identified for each policy event. 
Most importantly, the proposed measure of achieved preferences is sensitive to one of the most 
important challenges to the measuring of interest groups’ lobbying success and policy influence: 
capturing the “amount of luck” (Barry 1980b: 350) a group has in getting its preference reflected 
in the policy outcome. The study computes a preference attainment index which captures both 
the number of other interest groups supporting the same policy preference as well as the number 
of interest groups opposing it.  The aim of this is to capture the degree to which “the 
responsibility” for realizing one’s policy preference is shared among different actors lobbying for 
the same preference as well as the intensity of “countervailing forces” (lobbying opposition) that 
a group faced in getting its preference translated into policy outcomes (Austen-Smith and Wright 
1994; Mahoney 2007b; Dür and de Bièvre 2007; Klüver 2011). The proposed measure captures 
preference attainment relative to the lobbying environment described by the aggregate 
distribution of preferences and participation of interest organizations and is in line with what 
Lowery and Gray indicate as a fundamental dimension of  an interest group system: “[n]umbers 
of allies and enemies and how they are configured across an issue domain have a direct – albeit 
complex – bearing on the use of influence strategies and the fate of legislation” (Lower and Gray 
2004: 22). 
One could argue that in order to make more substantial claims and explanatory inferences 
about groups’ preference attainment at interest group level, the use of process tracing would be 
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advisable. However, this is beyond the purpose of the present research, which is interested in 
capturing the big picture of lobbying in a specific policymaking setting by providing an 
aggregate measure of preference attainment scores per advocate type, in an attempt to examine 
whether or not some interests, on average, are doing better in terms of getting their preferences 
translated into policy outcomes than others. Also, as the research tries to capture the preferences 
expressed by all stakeholders, performing process tracing would be virtually impossible when 
the number of interest groups can be as high as 184, like in the case of the consultation 
discussing the introduction of aviation activities in the Emissions Trading Scheme.    
To examine the level of plurality characterizing the EU interest intermediation system, 
the research develops three indexes.  First, the policy issue diversity index captures the diversity 
(plurality) of preferences expressed on issues raised within one consultation. Second, the interest 
type diversity index expresses the diversity of preferences articulated by organizations 
representing the same interests across issues. And third, the preference attainment index 
measures levels of preference attainment for each category of interest groups across issues and 
cases. Each index is discussed in detail below.  
2.1 Policy issue diversity index 
 
This index measures the level of diversity of preferences expressed by different interest 
groups on the same policy issue. It is computed based on the identification of substantially 
different and competing preferences expressed by interest organizations. The value of the index 
for issue j is constructed by (1) computing for each policy preference the proportion of the 
interest groups that adopted the preference from the total number of groups expressing a 
preference on that issue and (2) by subtracting from 1 the sum of squared shares of these 
proportions. The index estimates the probability that on one issue any two randomly selected 
interest groups adopt two different policy preferences. The mathematical expression of the index 
is the following: 
 
Where, heterogeneity of preferences on issue j (Hj): nj – number of preferences expressed on 
issue j, pij – the share of interest groups expressing preference i on issue j. 
 
 The index takes a value of 0 when all interest groups articulate the same preference on 
the issue or when pij equals 1 and nj equals 1. The index takes a value of 0.5 if only two 
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preferences are expressed on one policy issue and the two are supported by an equal number of 
interest groups. A value of 0.75 corresponds to a situation where interest groups express four 
different policy preferences and each preference is supported by the same number of interest 
groups.  
 
2.2 Interest type diversity index 
This index captures the level of variation with respect to the preferences expressed by 
organizations representing the same type of interest (i.e. business, environment, consumers’ 
rights, local government, etc.). The value of the index for issue j and interest type k is expressed 
by (1) computing for each policy preference the proportion of interest groups of type k that 
supported the preference from the overall number of groups of type k articulating a preference on 
that issue and (2) by subtracting from 1 the sum of squared shares of these proportions. This 
index indicates the probability that two randomly selected interest organizations representing the 
same interest type express a different preference on the considered policy issue. As already 
mentioned, this aims to capture the degree to which the EU interest group system displays any 
patterns of disciplined and concentrated lobbying activities of organizations representing the 
same interests.  The mathematical expression of the index is: 
 
Where, heterogeneity of preferences (of interest groups of type k) on issue j: njk – number of 
preferences taken on issue j by groups of type k, pijk – the share of interest groups of type k 
expressing preference i on issue j. 
 
This index works in a similar way to the policy issue diversity index. The only difference 
between the two is that the interest type diversity index takes into account only interest groups of 
the same type when computing the diversity score.  
 
2.3 Preference attainment index  
This index expresses the degree to which an interest group’s policy preferences are 
translated into outputs, weighted by the amount of support and opposition the group faced from 
the other interest groups participating in the consultation event. This measure is computed by 
assigning first a score of 0 or 1 to each interest group to identify the convergence (or lack 
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thereof) between the group’s preference and the policy outcome for each issue on which the 
group expressed a preference. This is weighted by an index expressing the strength of opposition 
the interest group had to face in terms of its expressed policy preference. This weight captures 
the number of interest groups adopting a different and hence competing policy preference to the 
one expressed by the considered interest group. This index has the following mathematical 
expression: 
 
Where, the preference attainment for interest group i : pij – preference attainment of interest 
group i on issue j, Oj – the share of interest groups that expressed a substantially different 
preference on issue j.  
 
In theoretical terms, this “opposition weight” can take continuous values from 0 to 1.  A 
value of 1 (possible only in theoretical terms though) indicates a situation of strongest possible 
opposition to a group’s preference, when only one group expressed the considered policy 
preference while an infinity of other groups adopted a different position. If an interest group has 
a value of 1 on the preference-outcome convergence score, and faces possible strongest 
opposition, then one can reliably infer that achieving its preference can be entirely attributed to 
its efforts and the group receives a 1 on the preference attainment index. Similarly, the 
“opposition weight” has a value of 0 in a situation where there was no opposition to the group’s 
expressed policy preferences, as no other group addressed an alternative, competing demand to 
decision makers. In this situation the overall preference attainment index for the interest group 
will have a value of 0; although the group did achieve its preference, no competing demands 
were expressed and there is consequently no way to disentangle the group’s contribution to the 
decision outcome. Of course, the index also has a value of 0 when the outcome does not 
correspond to a group’s policy demand.  
These three indexes are used to examine the level of plurality within the EU interest 
group system in the environmental policy domain and to investigate which pluralist label is the 
most appropriate for describing it. The following observable implications are derived in relation 
to the dimensions captured by these indexes: first, on each policy issue, the number of 
substantially different preferences articulated by interest groups provides valuable information 
about the level of plurality of voices articulated within the interest intermediation system. The 
more substantially different policy preferences are expressed on the same issue, the higher the 
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level of plurality, hence the more appropriate the label of a classic pluralist interest group system 
is. By contrast, a pattern of limited numbers of policy preferences expressed indicates a 
constrained pluralist interest intermediation system. 
Second, the level of preference diversity within interest group types provides information 
on the levels of concentration of lobbying within each category of interests represented at EU 
level. A high level of preference diversity within interest type indicates a highly plural interest 
group system, because this creates the premises for cross-cutting preferences and lobbying 
coalitions that prevent any single type of interest from monopolising the policy space with only 
one policy alternative. By contrast, a low heterogeneity index is an indication of a concentrated 
lobbying force from disciplined sectoral organizations, a situation which would be more in line 
with the constrained pluralist framework. 
Third, in a classic pluralist interest group system, characterized by no bias in favour of 
some particular interests, the average levels of preference attainment scores per interest group 
(advocate) type should not be significantly different from each other within each consultation. 
This would also be consistent with those accounts in the literature emphasizing the consensual 
nature of the EU interest group system and decision-making process in which all participants 
have something to gain from the decisions made across a set of issues characterizing a 
policymaking event (Mahoney 2008). By contrast, a pattern of significantly higher preference 
attainment scores on behalf of one type of interests (most commonly business) is consistent with 
a constrained pluralist interest group system. The observable implications derived from the two 
frameworks are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Types of pluralism and dimensions of plurality in the EU interest group system 
Dimension Classic pluralism Constrained pluralism 
Policy issue diversity  High Moderate  
Interest type diversity  High Moderate  
Preference attainment No pattern of significantly 
higher levels of preference 
attainment across policy issues 
in favour of some interests. 
Absence of bias.   
Patterns of moderate levels of 
significantly higher preference 
attainment scores on behalf of 
specific interests. Moderate 
levels of bias. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study examines the EU interest group system by analysing the policy formulation 
stage of five key legislative developments in the environmental policy area. The focus on the 
formulation stage is justified by this being considered the most popular lobbying venue at EU 
level, where interest groups have the highest chances to affect policy outcomes (Bouwen 2009). 
The focus on open consultations and the associated documentation for identifying policy 
preferences is supported by two aspects. First, the decision to analyse groups’ written 
submissions to the EC has a strong justification in the literature, which emphasises the high 
levels of institutionalisation of the dialogue between policymakers and interest groups at EU 
level, that usually takes place within formal settings such as public consultations, “advisory and 
consultative committees, expert groups” (Greenwood 2007b: 347). Second, position documents 
have long constituted an important data source in the well-established literature on American 
lobbying, focusing on groups’ formal interactions with bureaucracies and their participation in 
rule-making (McKay and Yackee 2007; Yackee and Yackee 2006). With some notable 
exceptions (Quittkat 2011; Rasmussen and Alexandrova 2012; Rasmussen and Caroll, 
forthcoming; Klüver 2011, Bunea 2013), EC open consultations, and the generous 
documentation resulting from them have been generally neglected in the literature, despite their 
great potential to provide essential insights as primary sources of information on European 
lobbying and the participation of private actors in the policymaking process. 
Environmental policy was chosen for analysis for two reasons. First, this is a core EU 
policy area, marked by important current policy developments, in which the Union has clear 
competences and interest groups have complete information about what policy demands can be 
addressed to policymakers and about whom they should target with their lobbying. Second, DG 
Environment, in charge of the management of this policy, is the second most lobbied DG of the 
European Commission after DG Enterprise (Coen 2007). This policy domain is generally 
characterized by the presence of relatively large numbers of interest groups which are different in 
both advocate type represented (business, environmental NGOs, local authorities, etc.) and in 
organizational format (European federations, individual firms, national associations). They 
channel into the decision-making system a large variety of interests having a stake in the EU 
regulation of environmental issues (Coen 2007: 337). This high mobilization of various 
organisations assures variation in terms of interests represented in the consultation, offering thus 
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a good opportunity to observe a potential bias in favour of some interests in terms of preference 
attainment during the policy formulation stage.  
Following an attentive investigation of the most important current policy developments in 
the environmental area, and based on data availability issues related to interest groups’ policy 
position documents, five stakeholders’ public consultations events were identified for the 
purpose of the present study. All five represent key policy events in the recent development of 
the European environmental policy and were aimed at updating or introducing new regulatory 
regimes regarding the reduction of CO2 emissions of passengers cars, introducing aviation 
activities under the Emissions Trading Scheme and the corresponding implementation 
mechanisms, introducing a waste management framework and revising the legislation on electric 
and electronic waste management. Throughout the analysis the five cases will be referred to as 
the “CO2 emissions case”, “aviation case”, “MRV case”, “waste case” and the “WEEE case”: 
 
1) The consultation aimed at formulating the proposal for a Regulation setting emission 
performance standards for new passenger cars (2007)
1
. This is referred to as the CO2 
emissions case. 
2) The consultation for formulating a proposal to include aviation activities in the scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Commission (December 2006)
2
. This 
is referred to as the aviation case. 
3) The consultation for formulating a decision on monitoring, reporting and verification 
mechanisms for aviation emissions included in the ETS scheme (October – November 
2008)
3
. This is referred to as the MRV case. 
4) The consultation for adopting a policy proposal for a Waste Framework Directive (December 
2005)
4
. This is referred to as the waste case. 
5) The consultation for adopting a proposal on revising the waste electrical and electronic 
equipment Directive (May 2008)
5
. This is referred to as the WEEE case.  
 
All five received media coverage in EU news portals, tackled the main topics of EU 
environmental policy, involved the participation of a variety of organizations and focused on 
                                                            
1 Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting emission 
performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community’s integrated approach to reduce CO2 
emissions from light-duty vehicles. 
2 Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities 
in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. 
3
Commission Decision of 16 April 2009 amending Decision 2007/589/EC as regards the inclusion of monitoring 
and reporting guidelines for emissions and tonne-kilometre data from aviation activities. 
4 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing 
certain directives. 
5 Proposal for a Directive on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE).  
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both technical and more political or publicly controversial issues. This makes the five 
consultations relevant examples of EU environmental policymaking.  
The analysis focuses on only one policy area and five consultation events only, due 
mainly to data collection constraints, as the research relies heavily on extracting interest groups’ 
policy preferences by hand-coding policy position documents formally sent by groups to the 
European Commission as part of the public consultation exercise. Although this research design 
strategy has the essential advantage of allowing a detailed and far more precise estimation of 
interest groups’ preferences, the human coding of documents is labour intensive, allowing for the 
analysis of only a reduced number of cases. The focus on one policy area might raise scepticism 
with respect to the generalizing power of the findings, given the fact that the literature suggests 
there is a certain amount of variation across EU policy areas in terms of modes of governance 
and interest groups’ participation (Mahoney 2008: 6). I address this potential scepticism by 
arguing that the main aim of this study is to inquire how an alternative approach to the study of 
the interest groups’ policymaking participation might provide a new and more sophisticated 
description and understanding of the structure and dynamics of the EU interest group system, 
that could be employed for the study of other policy areas and events. A trade-off was required 
between the depth of analysis, allowing a disaggregate measure of interest groups’ participation, 
and its breadth. Primacy was given to the former over the latter and this disaggregate level of 
analysis is one of the main contributions made by this study. 
A policy issue is a discrete policy problem on which the Commission explicitly asks for 
stakeholders’ policy input. For each consultation, I identified issues based on three sources. First, 
for consultations requiring the submission of written position documents, the text of the 
Commission’s consultation call was used to identify issues (consultation on the reduction of CO2 
emissions for passenger cars, on the waste management directive and the revision of the WEEE 
directive). Second, for consultations based on open-ended questionnaires, the questions of the 
questionnaire served to identify issues (the two consultations on the introduction of aviation 
activities in the Emissions Trading Scheme). Third, groups’ written submissions or answers to 
questionnaires were used to identify issues added to the consultation agenda by groups 
themselves. To be considered an issue and included in the dataset, this latter category of issues 
needed to be recurrent across several contributions. However, a negligible number of such issues 
were identified. This is in line with the Commission’s efforts to structure its dialogue with 
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stakeholders in order to keep data management feasible. To exemplify the concept of policy 
issue employed by this research, the following list presents the ten issues identified for the 
consultation on the reduction of CO2 emissions for passenger cars: (1) measures assuring that the 
proposed target of 120g/km for the reduction of CO2 emissions is reached; (2) time frame for 
reaching the targets; (3) including commercial vans in the regulation; (4) parameter(s) for 
deciding what vehicles are covered by the regulation; (5) should targets be mandatory; (6) should 
there be penalties for non-compliance; (7) fiscal incentives to assure target compliance; (8) 
harmonizing cars’ labelling system; (9) establishing an EU wide car marketing code of conduct; 
(10) flexibilities allowed for car manufacturers to reach the target. The study analyses 107 
different issues corresponding to five consultations. Table 2 presents the total number of issues 
and interest organizations per consultation.  
 
Table 2: Number of interest groups and policy issues per case 
Case CO2 emissions Aviation MRV* aviation Waste WEEE** 
Policy issues 10 6 51 15 25 
Interest groups 45 184 37 138 164 
*MRV – Monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms for introducing aviation activities into the Emissions 
Trading Scheme. **WEEE – Waste Electric and Electronic equipment Directive. 
 
The number of issues per consultation ranges from 6 to 51, showing a high variation 
across consultations. This is attributable to the nature of the consultation and to the consultation 
tools. The consultation for the introduction of aviation activities in the ETS scheme was general 
in its scope and therefore revolved around only six issues. The consultation on the monitoring, 
verification and reporting mechanisms for introducing aviation in the ETS involved 51 issues 
and asked for feedback on very precise technical matters. This variation provides a rather fair 
representation of the EU policymaking process, which is characterised by different levels of 
technicality of its measures within the same policy area, as well as across different policy 
domains. 
For each event, interest groups’ policy preferences were identified based on the content 
analysis of the policy position documents submitted to the European Commission during the 
public consultation stage and of the interest organisations’ answers to the online questionnaire 
the Commission used as a consultation tool for the aviation case. Based on sources, for each 
policy issue, a nominal scale was used to estimate interest groups’ policy preferences. Each 
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preference received a value indicating that the preference is substantially different from the other 
preferences expressed by other interest organisations on the same issue, without saying however 
by how much or in which respect. This value was used in the dataset to indicate a group’s 
position on the identified policy issue. Interest organizations expressing the same preference 
received an identical score. Figure 2 illustrates the concept of policy preference employed in the 
present research. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Interest groups’ policy preferences on the issue of what flexibilities should be allowed for 
car manufacturers to reach the required target of CO2 emissions. Where: T&E (Transport and 
Environment), FOE UK (Friends of the Earth UK), WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature), ACEA (European Car 
Manufacturers Association), KAMA (Korean Automobile Manufacturers’ Association), JAMA (Japanese 
Automobile Manufacturers’ Association), GM (General Motors), ANFAC (Spanish Association of Automobile and 
Tracks Association). 
 
Figure 2 exemplifies the policy space described by the aggregate distribution of interest 
groups’ preferences across issues and organizations in the consultation on the reduction of the 
CO2 emissions. 
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Figure 2: Policy issues and distribution of interest groups’ preferences in the consultation on the 
reduction of CO2 emissions for new passenger cars. 
 
Based on the content analysis of the policy proposal drafted by the Commission post-
consultation, I identified the policy outcomes, i.e the policy alternatives chosen by the 
Commission as proposed policy measures. This allowed me to estimate groups’ preference 
attainment on each issue by identifying which preferences were translated into outcomes.  I 
looked at the correspondence between an interest group’s preference and the outcome formulated 
in the text of the proposal.  
For open-ended questionnaires the identification of both issues and preferences was 
straightforward. However, the study had to examine the reliability of the coding scheme for 
interest groups’ policy position documents. Two strategies were pursued. First, one inter-coder 
reliability test was performed on the CO2 emissions for passenger cars case. A coding protocol 
was developed stating clearly what type of statements should be taken into account for recording 
a group’s preference, the unit of analysis (text paragraphs addressing a specific issue), the data 
recording format and the guidelines for dealing with potentially less clear texts. Another coder 
was asked to independently identify the issues and groups’ preferences on each issue. The results 
were encouraging: ten out of fourteen issues identified by the two coders were identical. The 
coding of preferences was identical with respect to 73 per cent of the interest group–issue dyads 
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identified (Krippendorff’s Alpha = 0.77, C.I: 0.7; 0.84)6. Second, the issues identified for this 
consultation were cross-checked with Klüver’s (2009: 541) hand-coding scheme of issues 
pertaining to the same event. This scheme identifies twenty categories of issues in relation to 
which organisations made policy statements. Seventeen of them were identified as part of my 
coding scheme as well, providing further evidence of a sound coding of written submissions in 
the present research. 
The policy position documents submitted by interest groups allowed the identification of 
the universe of private actors participating in the public consultations. Following a thorough 
analysis of documents and interest groups’ official websites, each interest organisation 
considered in the analysis has been assigned to one of the following six categories of advocate 
type to express the main interests represented in each event: (1) Main business  –  businesses 
whose activities were directly affected by the measures proposed (e.g car manufacturers in the 
consultation on CO2 emissions) ; (2) Secondary business – businesses that were not directly 
affected by the measures (e.g. the European Association of Aluminium in the same consultation); 
(3) Environmental NGOs; (4) Local authorities; (5) National authorities; (6) Other (e.g. 
professional organizations). 
 
 
4. PLURALITY OF VOICES AND THE EU SYSTEM OF INTREST 
REPRESENTATION  
4.1 Policy issues and diversity of preferences 
The first aggregate measure proposed for examining the plurality of the interest group 
system is the policy issue diversity index, a measure of the heterogeneity of policy preferences 
expressed by interest groups. On average, the consultation on the monitoring, reporting and 
verification mechanisms for introducing aviation activities in the ETS (the MRV consultation) 
displays the least diverse policy spectrum, with a median score of policy issue diversity of 0.3. 
This consultation was overwhelmingly attended by interest organizations representing the 
interests of aircraft operators and of the aviation industry. These groups expressed the same 
policy preferences on the same issues, displaying a pattern of disciplined and concentrated 
lobbying efforts, resembling more a corporatist tradition of interest intermediation. This 
                                                            
6 The confidence intervals for the Krippendorff’s Alpha coefficient were computed using the SPSS algorithm 
designed for this based on Hayes and Krippendorff (2007). 
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homogeneity of preferences could also result from the relatively high level of technicality of the 
policy issues addressed in this consultation, for which reason the European Commission decided 
to use a semi-standardized questionnaire as a consultation tool to keep the data management 
feasible (Quittkat 2011: 661). While assuring a more effective communication channel of policy 
feedback on behalf of interest groups, the use of this consultation tool might well have reduced 
the plurality of policy alternatives suggested by stakeholders, although respondents were given 
the freedom to articulate different preferences in relation to very specific issues.  
The highest plurality of preferences was articulated in the consultation on the waste 
framework directive, with an index median score of 0.62. This should be read in the light of 
relatively high levels of generality of the consultation, which invited stakeholders to provide 
input on the adoption of general guidelines for setting a framework on waste management at EU 
level. This level of generality is somehow in contrast with the more technical and hence specific 
nature of the consultation debate in the other four cases, as well as the fact that the Commission 
adopted a classic, non-standardized consultation format in which interest organizations could 
submit written position documents. This might have contributed to increasing the diversity of 
policy alternatives suggested by stakeholders as potential policy outcomes.  
 
Figure 3: Policy issue diversity index per consultation: n indicates the number of total 
issues per case 
 
An attentive examination of the diversity scores computed per issue for each case, reveals 
variation of the features of issues that get on the agenda during the policy formulation stage: one 
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can identify a set of contentious issues on which several, substantially different, preferences were 
articulated by private actors, as well as a set of issues characterized by virtually no controversy 
in terms of policy options. Three of the five consultations present issues on which the diversity 
index has a value of 0.7 or slightly higher, while two of them present at least one issue on which 
there is only one policy preference being articulated. The consultation on adopting a proposal for 
reducing the CO2 emissions of passenger cars exemplifies well this variation. Here, the issue of 
how the proposed target for reducing CO2 emissions of cars should be achieved raised more 
controversy then all other issues. On the contrary, issues such as making the CO2 emission 
targets mandatory or not, introducing penalties for not complying with the targets or harmonizing 
the labeling of cars system across the EU to express the CO2 performance of cars, raised no 
controversy and only one policy preference was expressed by interest groups on these issues.  
Two implications of these findings are worth mentioning. First, in terms of describing the 
interest intermediation system, we observe moderate levels of diversity in the 
preferences/demands expressed on the issues raised within the same policymaking event. In four 
out of the five consultations, there are moderate levels of preference diversity, in the sense that 
the average probability that two randomly selected groups have different preferences on an issue 
is lower than 0.5. On average, across policy issues and consultation events, a pattern of 
constrained/limited pluralism describes the EU interest group system. Second, although not 
directly related to the characteristics of the interest groups system, it is worth noting that there is 
substantial variation in the policy diversity index within each consultation. This variation 
suggests that issue-level characteristics are highly relevant when analyzing the determinants of 
interest groups’ policy influence (Mahoney 2008). On each policy issue, interest groups’ levels 
of preference attainment are expected to be affected by substantially different preferences 
competing with each other within the system (Holyoke 2009; Lowery and Gray 2004: 22).  
4.2 Interest type and diversity of preferences 
The second aggregate index is the interest type diversity index, a measure aimed at 
capturing the degree to which the system displays patterns of disciplined and concentrated 
lobbying on behalf of interest groups representing the same type of interest. The expectation is 
that, in a pluralist system, individual interest groups representing broadly the same type of 
interest or the same economic or societal sector (e.g business, environmental organizations, local 
authorities) should articulate (at least at times or on certain policy issues) different policy 
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preferences. This diversity creates the premises for cross-sectoral lobby alliances and policy 
alignments, which in turn represents a guarantee against the emergence of a potentially 
monopolizing lobby on behalf of some specific interests (usually business). In short, the 
argument is that the higher the levels of this index per interest group type, the higher the level of 
pluralism characterizing the interest intermediation system. 
 Figure 4 presents the aggregate picture described by this index for the five consultations. 
For each case, the figure presents the values of the diversity index for those categories (advocate 
type) of interest organizations that expressed preferences on three or more issues. This threshold 
was chosen based on the assumption that measuring heterogeneity of preferences for each 
advocate type makes sense only by examining a relevant enough number of issues.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Interest type diversity index per consultation 
The findings show a pattern of low to relatively moderate levels of diversity of 
preferences articulated by business interest groups, usually with the lowest plurality levels for 
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“Main business”. On all issues in the consultation on the reduction of CO2 emissions, interest 
groups representing the car industry articulated the same policy preferences, showing disciplined 
lobbying on most environmental measures that were generally considered to be additional 
burdens on the car industry. Similarly, aircraft operators, the main business having a direct stake 
in the consultation on the monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms for aviation 
activities introduced in the ETS scheme (the MRV consultation), show disciplined lobbying in 
terms of expressed policy preferences, with an average heterogeneity score value under 0.2. 
As shown in my previous work (Bunea 2012: 117-140), in both of these consultations the 
interests of the European car manufacturers and aviation industries have been represented by 
organizations which were closely linked by inter-organizational ties. In my earlier work I 
demonstrate a strong effect of inter-organizational ties in predicting similarity of preferences 
between interest groups sharing a formal organizational link (Bunea 2014). In light of this, the 
consultations on CO2 emissions and the MRV case describe an interest intermediation system 
characterized by well mobilized, disciplined, concentrated lobbying efforts on behalf of those 
sectoral interests incurring the costs of the proposed regulatory measures. 
A similar pattern of low levels of preference diversity within interest type is displayed by 
organizations representing the interests of producers of electric and electronic equipment in the 
WEEE consultation. These organizations expressed very similar policy preferences with respect 
to policy alternatives on the management of electric and electronic waste, as their aim was to 
reduce the number of measures that would impose extra constraints on the producers of electric 
and electronic products. The homogeneity of expressed policy preferences corresponds to a 
disciplined, concentrated lobbying coalition of interest organizations, closely linked by inter-
organizational ties. 
Environmental NGOs display a mixed pattern of expressed preferences.
7
 They show a 
disciplined and homogenous lobbying in the case of the CO2 emissions of passenger cars 
(expressing different preferences on two policy issues only), but a moderate diversity of 
                                                            
7 Only one environmental NGO participated in the consultation on the monitoring and verification mechanisms for 
introducing aviation activities in the ETS and expressed a policy preference on only 2 out of the 51 issues discussed 
in the consultation. Similarly, only 3 environment NGOs participated in the consultation on the electric and 
electronic waste. These are not taken into account in the analysis because they articulated preferences on less than 
three policy issues.  
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preferences articulated in the consultations on the adoption of a waste framework directive and 
the inclusion of aviation activities in the ETS. 
In line with the values of the policy issue diversity index, the interest type diversity index 
also shows a pattern of low to moderate levels of plurality. A first interpretation of these results 
is that there are potential corporatist features characterizing the system, with business groups 
displaying low to moderate levels of diversity of preferences if they are part of the economic 
sector that incurs most of the costs emerging from the proposed regulatory measures. This 
finding provides empirical support for the classic Olsonian argument that, in order to protect 
their economic stakes, “specific interests” are better able to overcome collective action problems 
and are better able to speak with one voice on issues of primary interest to them (Olson 1965). 
This is also supported by the identified patterns of inter-organizational ties linking stakeholders 
in the policy community, which indicate the presence of strategic, coordinated lobbying actions 
on behalf of organizations representing business interests (see Bunea 2014). This shows that the 
identified homogeneity of interests follows from interest groups’ decision to lobby the 
Commission by speaking with a coherent, unified voice when representing their sectoral 
interests.  
However, the observed levels of diversity of preferences within same interest type might 
also be a consequence of the fact that the environmental policy area is predominantly 
characterized by regulatory measures that “generally entail concentrated benefits for one and 
concentrated costs for another group” (Dür 2008a: 1217). In line with Wilson’s theory of 
regulatory politics and interest group behaviour (1980), regulatory regimes with narrow 
concentrations of costs and benefits in different sectors of society are associated with high levels 
of interest group mobilization and the creation of well-defined and articulated lobbying sides 
(Wilson 1980: 368-369).  
Instead of being the mark of a corporatist system, the observed homogeneity of policy 
preferences within interest group type could instead be interpreted an indication of a well 
institutionalized interest groups system in which organizations pursue clear lobbying agendas 
and act strategically in response to the specificities of the policy environment, in an attempt to 
maximize their payoffs during the policymaking process. This view is consistent with what 
Wilson (1980) identified as a system characterized by interest groups politics which, according 
to his theory, is expected to produce inclusive decision-making outcomes, reflecting the interests 
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and policy propositions of large and different parts of the stakeholders’ community. I address 
this issue in the next subsection and I take the analysis one step further by examining the levels 
of policy preferences achieved by different interest organizations across the analyzed 
consultations. 
4.3 Interest groups and preference attainment  
The last index proposed is that of interest groups preference attainment, a weighted 
measure of the preferences each organization translated into policy outcomes. The index 
estimates interest groups’ policy influence and allows us to examine patterns of potential bias. 
Figure 5 presents the aggregate values of weighted preference attainment scores for interest 
organizations by type of interest represented.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Weighted preference attainment scores per consultation and advocate type 
 
 The results indicate that, on average, main business interest groups tend to achieve higher 
levels of preference attainment than other advocate types. This varies however across cases. 
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Table 3 shows that their levels of preference attainment are in most cases significantly higher 
than that of groups representing other interests. The table gives the values of the t-statistics and 
of the corresponding Bonferoni adjusted p-values for a series of paired comparisons.  
Table 3: T-test values and Bonferoni adjusted p-value for paired comparisons of preference 
attainment scores by advocate type 
 CO2 emissions Aviation MRV Waste WEEE 
      
Main business  vs. 
Environmental NGOs 
    2.8*** 
 
3.41** 
 
n/a    2.14 0.12 
Secondary business vs. 
Environmental NGOs 
-0.23 
 
0.23 
 
n/a    0.20 -0.64 
Main vs. Secondary 
business 
2.12* 
 
2.86* 
 
0.61 
 
   3.18** 
 
0.89 
 
Main business vs. 
National authorities 
n/a -0.61 
 
n/a 5.28* 
 
-1.43 
 
Secondary business vs. 
National authorities 
n/a -2.35 
 
n/a    1.99 
 
-2.25 
 
Main business vs.  
Local authorities 
n/a 3.31** 
 
n/a   3.34** 
 
 3.76*** 
 
Secondary business vs. 
Local  authorities 
n/a 0.80 
 
n/a    0.41 3.19** 
 
*The difference between groups is statistically significant at p < 0.1. 
**The difference between groups is statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
***The difference between groups is statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
 
The results indicate that main business interest groups display significantly higher 
preference attainment scores relative to other advocate types participating in the events. In two of 
the four consultations for which observations were available on the preference attainment scores 
for environmental NGOs, business preferences were more likely to be translated into policy 
outcomes than preferences expressed by environmentalists. Similarly, in three of the five 
consultations, organizations representing main business were more successful in achieving their 
preferences than organizations representing secondary business. Relative to national authorities 
participating in the consultations, main business interests were more successful only in the 
consultation for the formulation of a waste framework directive. Main business organizations 
were of more consequence for policy outcomes than organizations representing local authorities 
in all three cases where local authorities participated as stakeholders.  
By comparison, organizations representing secondary business do not show on average 
significantly higher preference attainment scores relative to environmental NGOs and national 
authorities. Only in the consultation on the revision of the WEEE directive, were secondary 
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business organizations significantly more successful than local authorities in translating 
preferences into outcomes. 
Within cases, we can observe that in three out of five consultations, main business 
interests were in a clearly better position to affect policy outcomes than other interest groups. 
These findings are in line with those contributions to the literature claiming that EU 
policymaking is disproportionately influenced by business interest groups to the detriment of 
other societal or sectoral interests (Chari and Kritzinger 2006; Beyers 2004; Greenwood 2007b; 
Kohler-Koch 1997; Pollack 1997). Most of these contributions drew their conclusions on case 
studies and process tracing, focusing their analysis usually on a relatively narrow number of 
interest groups. The number of policy issues based on which lobby success was analyzed was 
also usually low. Business interest groups were, most of the time, assumed to be homogenous, 
thus not making a clear and necessary distinction between groups having direct and primary 
interests in a decision-making event and organizations having only secondary policy stakes. As 
shown by the consultation on the reduction of CO2 emissions, this distinction is important as 
within the same decision-making event some business groups achieve their preferences while 
others do not. These findings support the existing literature but they do so in a more systematic, 
empirically grounded manner and use more fine-grained measures of interest groups’ preferences 
than is currently available in the literature. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study addressed an important theoretical debate in the literature on EU interest 
groups on what is the most appropriate label for describing the EU interest intermediation 
system. In answering this question, it suggested an alternative, new approach to evaluating 
plurality in the community of stakeholders participating in EU environmental consultations. This 
approach consisted of two key elements: first, an evaluation of the system of interest 
representation by examining issue and preference data; and second, the formulation and 
application of a set of indexes capturing the plurality of policy alternatives advocated on each 
issue, the plurality of preferences within the community of organizations representing the same 
interests and finally a measure of success of different interests in achieving their preferences. In 
addition, a concise evaluation of the interest group communities articulated around the 
considered consultations was conducted by describing the aggregate distribution of interests 
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across and within consultations, as well as the aggregate distribution of organizational 
characteristics.  
The findings provide support for the constrained pluralist view, showing a moderate 
diversity of preferences articulated on policy issues, low to moderate heterogeneity of demands 
articulated by groups representing the same type of interest, and a clear pattern of higher levels 
of preference attainment on behalf of main business organizations. The examination of the 
aggregate distribution of interests represented in the consultations provided further empirical 
support for the constrained pluralist description of the EU interest intermediation system in that it 
indicated higher levels of organizational mobilization and participation in the consultations on 
behalf of main business.   
Several implications follow from these findings. First, despite the overall moderate levels 
of diversity of preferences expressed across policy issues, the research found a rather high within 
case variation of diversity of preferences articulated per policy issue. In doing this, the research 
provides empirical support to those scholars who previously emphasized the importance of issue 
level characteristics, including the level of contentiousness of policy alternatives (Dür 2008a; 
Mahoney 2008; Lowery and Gray 2004). This study makes a contribution to the existing 
literature by suggesting the policy issue diversity index as an elegant and reliable measure of 
levels of policy issue contentiousness. However, this proposed index for measuring plurality 
leaves one important aspect to be addressed by further research and debate: what values of the 
index are appropriate thresholds for distinguishing low, moderate and high levels of pluralism 
within the system? In addition, what factors encourage interest organizations to articulate policy 
preferences on different policy issues, thereby increasing the diversity of voices heard on one 
particular issue?  Despite its high theoretical relevance, this question has not been currently 
addressed in the literature in a systematic manner (Warntjen and Wonka 2004: 16).  
Also, future research should aim to rank the identified policy preferences on a policy 
scale. A metric ordinal scale should be used instead of a nominal one, in order to estimate 
interest groups’ policy preferences. This step would provide an even more refined measure of 
diversity characterizing policy issues at EU level, as well as an alternative estimation of 
preference attainment by using the policy distance between outcome and policy preference as a 
more precise indicator. Expert interviews and discussions with European Commission desk 
officers, in-charge of the considered dossiers, would be particularly helpful in an attempt to 
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understand the technical EU policy issues and decision-making processes, and rate preferences 
on a policy continuum. 
Some interests displayed a pattern of disciplined lobbying, such as the car manufacturing 
industry and the aviation industry. One argument made in this study was that the presence of a 
concentrated lobby on behalf of certain sectors could be interpreted as an indicator of a mature 
and institutionalized interest intermediation system, where private actors representing similar 
interests coordinate well and cooperate with each other to achieve common policy goals. 
However, this pattern could also be the indicator of underlying corporatist features of the system 
that prevent cross-sectoral policy alignments from occurring, thus increasing the chances for a 
monopoly on decision making to emerge on behalf of those interests that are better able to 
coordinate their policy preferences and lobbying efforts. With the help of the proposed index, but 
focusing on a larger and more diverse sample of decision-making points and events from 
different policy areas, future research should investigate whether this pattern holds across 
policymaking stages and policy arenas, observing whether some interests display a systematic 
pattern of disciplined lobbying within the EU policymaking system, irrespective of policymaking 
circumstances. Extending the analysis to other policy areas where decisions are being made also 
on distributive and redistributive policy issues, future research would be able to identify whether 
the observed concentration of policy preferences, which inevitably speaks of a limited plurality 
of the system, is something specific to the regulatory nature of the EU environmental policy.  
Finally, this study proposed a measure of interest groups’ preference attainment and used 
this as an instrument to identify the levels of potential bias in the interest group system. The 
findings describe an interest group system and policymaking process favouring business interests 
over all others. Their preferences were found to be consistently more likely to be translated into 
outcomes. A research question to be addressed by future research is thus the following: what 
factors explain this variation in levels of preference attainment across different advocate types?  
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